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Caveat Taxpayer: How and Why the Internal
Revenue Service May Examine Your Books, Your
Accountant and Even Your Attorney
The IRS is authorized, by the use of an administrative summons, to thor-
oughly inspect a taxpayer's business and financial background. Although the
taxpayer's attorney may feel powerless to restrict this free flow of informa-
tion, there are defined limitations to the use of an administrative summons.
These limitations are designed to abrogate its abuse by the IRS. This comment
provides a summary of the limitations of an administrative summons, case
law interpretation of the requirements for its issuance, and practical consid-
erations for the protection of the taxpayer's financial privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BELEAGUERED TAXPAYER
Picture the so-called average American taxpayer: It's April 14th,
tax receipts, wage statements and checkstubs pile up around his
kitchen table as he sifts through volumes of Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) publications and instructions. All taxable income must be
recorded correctly and each expense must be individually researched
in order to prove its deductibility. Each property transaction must be
properly labeled as capital or non-capital, long-term or short-term.
All t's must be crossed and all i's dotted in order to correctly figure
his true tax liability and avoid an audit with the dreaded IRS.
Therein lies the subject of satirical cartoons and election year
promises.
The reality of all this, however, is that the average American tax-
payer is ill-equipped to analyze the voluminous and complicated tax
laws of the United States. Based on this reality, many taxpayers turn
to professional tax preparers, Certified Public Accountants, or attor-
neys for advice.
These "tax" professionals are ill-equipped to protect their clients'
interests when the IRS seeks information about the taxpayer's re-
turns. The IRS, armed with a legislatively enacted and judicially en-
forceable administrative warrant, can search into the taxpayer's
records and his preparer's records-even examine his attorney under
oath-merely to insure that the taxpayer's return is correct.
Can the IRS really do such things? Will the Constitution stand for
it? Is there a valid rationale for such powers? The answers to these
questions is an emphatic yes.
This comment will delineate the power of an IRS administrative
summons used to examine books and witnesses, the liberal construc-
tion given to this power by the courts, and the rationale or policy
considerations underlying such power. Finally, a few practice sugges-
tions will be given on how an attorney can best protect his client
from the powerful IRS.
II. THE RATIONALE BEHIND IRS EXAMINATION POWERS
Before researching the tremendous powers which Congress has be-
stowed upon the IRS, one should first understand why such powers
were granted and what the IRS hopes to accomplish. In general, the
mission of the IRS is to collect the nation's revenues by enforcing
compliance with tax laws.1 Since the United States operates under a
self-reporting system, 2 voluntary compliance must occur for the
American taxation system to work.3 In modern times, however, non-
compliance seems to be in vogue. 4 In order to decrease taxpayer non-
compliance, the IRS must be allowed sweeping powers to enforce
compliance with the tax laws.
The American Bar Association's Section of Taxation has developed
some astounding statistics on the amount of income unreported in
the United States. 5 While noncompliance estimates are subject to
definitional problems and less than perfect data,6 one economist esti-
1. More exactly, the function of the IRS is to:
[E]ncourage and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary compliance
with the tax laws and regulations and to maintain the highest degree of public
confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the Service. This includes com-
municating the requirements of the law to the public, determining the extent
of compliance and causes of non-compliance and cause all things needful to a
proper enforcement of the law.
39 Fed. Reg. 11,572 (1974).
2. Id. The fact that Americans are required to keep their own records and sum-
marize their own income, rather than report each transaction to the IRS, increases the
chances of mistake and fraud occurring because the average taxpayer is not well
versed in tax law and records can be kept so as to "hide" income.
3. Williams, Strengthening IRS Examination and Collection Processes by Admin-
istrative Changes in Staffing, Training, Deployment and Technology in Income Tax
Compliance, A REP. OF THE A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N INVITATIONAL CONF. ON INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE 235, 235 (1983) [Hereinafter cited as REP. ON TAX COMPLIANCE]. Mr. Wil-
liams goes on to say that the effectiveness of the tax administration has been reduced
due to an inadequate budget. Id. at 237.
4. Keynote Address by Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
A.B.A. Sec. of Tax'n Invitational Conf. on Income Tax Compliance (March 16, 1983),
reprinted in REP. ON TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 11-14.
5. REP. ON TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 243-45.
6. Henry, Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law--Evidence on Size, Growth and
Composition, REP. ON TAX COMPLIANCE, supra note 3, at 15-17. Several other studies
have been undertaken to estimate the extent and amount of noncompliance and tax-
payer attitudes. See Mason & Calvin, A Study of Admitted Income Tax Evasion, 13
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 73 (1978) (interviews with taxpayers regarding their outlook on
noncompliance and their acknowledged noncompliance conduct); Song & Yarbrough,
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mated that unreported income in 1976 was approximately $100 bil-
lion. 7 This amounts to about 13 percent of total United States
income.8 If this estimate is even close to being correct, the United
States Treasury is being cheated out of large amounts of revenue, an-
other compelling reason for allotting the IRS sufficient powers to
force taxpayer compliance.
The national debt, which has become an important political issue in
recent years, is another rationale for broad IRS examination powers.
The national debt has risen dramatically from 43 billion dollars in
1940 to 1.5 trillion dollars in 1984.9 Further, it'is expected to rise to
2.8 trillion dollars by the end of the 1980's.10 These numbers are sim-
ply staggering."1 The bottom line is that the United States needs the
money.
III. THE SOURCE OF IRS EXAMINATION POWERS: 26 U.S.C. § 7602
The IRS has been granted far-reaching examination and inspection
powers by Congress.12 Such authority is not a modern development.
In fact, the government has had wide-ranging powers to examine
books and witnesses since 1927.13
Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey, 38 PUB. AD. REV. 442 (1978) (taxpayers
regard noncompliance to be less serious than the theft of a bicycle).
7. Henry, supra note 6, at 62.
8. Id.
9. Karmin & Morse, Exploding Federal Debt - Why So Dangerous, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 22, 1984, at 74.
10. Id. (as estimated by the Federal Office of Management and Budget). However,
the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that federal debt will exceed
three trillion dollars by 1989. Id.
11. One must remember, however, how inaccurate economists can be. See, e.g.,
Greenwald, The Forecasters Flunk, TIME, Aug. 27, 1984, at 42-44 (some of the foremost
economists in the United States have failed to predict the 1984 economic boom and the
1981-82 recession).
12. The full scope of such power is described in I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1982), which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determin-
ing the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax ... or collecting
any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized -
(1) To examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax ... or any person having posses-
sion, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the
business of the person liable for tax ... or any other person the Secretary or
his delegate may deem proper, to appear ...and to produce such books, pa-
pers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry ....
13. In particular, section 7602 is based upon the following sections of the Revenue
Act of 1926 and revised statutes: § 3714 (summons); § 3175 (failure to obey summons;
A. Purpose of Section 7602
The IRS is given summons powers under section 7602 for the fol-
lowing purposes: (1) to determine if a tax return is correct; (2) to
make a return where none has been made; and (3) to determine the
tax liability of any person or the liability, at law or in equity, of any
transferee or fiduciary of that person, or to collect such liability.14 In
order to prove any of the above, the IRS is empowered "[t]o examine
any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant
.... ,"15 While at first glance this power to examine any relevant
documents may seem appropriate, if carried to its logical conclusion,
all of the taxpayer's records "may be relevant" to his tax return.
Statutes relating to examination of books and witnesses have gener-
ally been broadly applied by the courts when found to be in pursuit
of a legitimate purpose.16
B. Mechanics of Section 7602
The authority to issue a summons is given to the Secretary or his
delegate by section 7602. But in July, 1980, a Delegation Order be-
came effective which expanded the number of IRS employees with
authority to issue a summons.17
An IRS investigation must have a legitimate purpose and the inves-
tigation must be in furtherance of that purpose.' 8 Moreover, the IRS
proceedings); § 3176 (when collector may enter premises and make returns). Also in-
cluded is the Revenue Act of 1926, § 1122 (power to secure testimony; jurisdiction of
federal courts).
14. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1982). See supra note 12.
15. Id. at § 7602(a)(1) (emphasis added).
16. See id. at §§ 7602, 7604.
17. Del. Order No. 4 (Rev. 8), 1979-1 C.B. 472 (effective April 18, 1979). See also
Del. Order No. 4 (Rev. 11), 1980-2 C.B. 752 (effective July 11, 1980) (further outlining
the authority to issue summonses).
18. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). This legitimate purpose doc-
trine has been widely cited and followed. In the District of Columbia: United States v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 573 F. Supp. 811, 813 (D.D.C. 1983). In the First Cir-
cuit: United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316, 319 (1st Cir. 1979); United States
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 575 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.R.I. 1983). In the Second Cir-
cuit: United States v. Beacon Fed. Sav. & Loan, 718 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1983); United
States v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In the Third
Circuit: SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 1981); Drum
v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 938, 940 (M.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 735 F.2d 1348 (3d Cir.
1984). In the Fourth Circuit: United States v. Richards, 631 F.2d 341, 344 (4th Cir.
1980); Universal Life Church v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 181, 183 (W.D. Va. 1983).
In the Fifth Circuit: United States v. Southeast First Nat'l Bank, 655 F.2d 661, 664 (5th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Hill, 537 F. Supp. 677, 678 (N.D. Tex. 1982). In the Sixth
Circuit: United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983); Frent v. United
States, 571 F. Supp. 739, 740-41 (E.D. Mich. 1983), appeal dismissed and remanded, 734
F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1984). In the Seventh Circuit: Kroll v. United States, 573 F. Supp.
982, 985 (N.D. Ind. 1983). In the Eighth Circuit: United States v. Barter Systems, Inc.,
694 F.2d 163, 165 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Moon, 472 F. Supp. 554, 555 (E.D. Mo.
1979), affd, 616 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1980). In the Ninth Circuit: United States v. South-
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must not already possess the sought-after information, and the ad-
ministrative procedures outlined in the Code must be followed.19
However, the facts of each case are necessarily different, and sifting
out the specific purpose of each examination can prove to be difficult.
The results have varied. Taking a strict view of the legitimate pur-
pose doctrine, the fourth circuit has held that a section 7602 sum-
mons must be for the singular purpose of determining tax liability,
and any other aim surpasses the field of authority granted to the
IRS.20 However, the fifth circuit has ruled that the dual purpose of
determining the correctness of a return and assembling research data
be allowed.2 1
C. Good Faith
A section 7602 summons must be issued in good faith.22 An IRS
agent must swear that the requested summons is directed toward ob-
taining records material to determining the civil tax liability of the
taxpayer.23 When such a showing is made, the government has met
its burden of good faith, and the burden shifts to the taxpayer to
prove the government acted in bad faith.24
However, consider the situation of an agent ordered to investigate a
taxpayer pursuant to an invalid IRS policy.25 Without knowledge
that the policy is invalid, the individual agent can be said to be acting
ern Pac. Transp. Co., 691 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Coates, 526 F.
Supp. 248, 256 (E.D. Cal. 1981), offd in part, 692 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1982). In the Tenth
Circuit: United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1982), va-
cated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1095 (1982); Voss v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 957, 960
(D. Colo. 1983). In the Eleventh Circuit: In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (11th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1678 (1984).
19. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. Specifically, section 7604, regarding the procedural
enforcement of a summons, must be adhered to. In essence, the Secretary must apply
to the district court for a contempt order if the taxpayer refuses to comply with the
summons.
20. United States v. Richards, 631 F.2d 341, 344-45 (4th Cir. 1981).
21. United States v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 635 F.2d 391, 396 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981) (the court states that such a dual purpose is expressly au-
thorized by § 7602 and, since the summons was issued in good faith, the court cannot
deny its enforcement).
22. United States v. Manufacturers Bank of Southfield, 518 F. Supp. 495, 496 (E.D.
Mich. 1981), remanded sub nom. United States v. Michigan Nat'l Bank of Oakland, 709
F.2d 1511 (6th Cir. 1983) (Close scrutiny of one religious group by the IRS does not
imply bad faith in the absence of allegations that the investigation is based solely on
that group's religious beliefs or affiliations.).
23. Id at 496.
24. Id. at 496-97.
25. For example, issuing a section 7602 summons for the sole purpose of a criminal
investigation.
in subjective good faith. Hopefully such a situation will be rare, but
this may illustrate why courts are more interested in the institutional
posture of the IRS rather than the agent's good faith.26
D. Before Recommendation for Criminal Prosecution
A summons may not be issued if a recommendation by the IRS to
the Justice Department has been made concerning a grand jury in-
vestigation or criminal prosecution of the taxpayer.27 Since tax law
merges both criminal law and civil law, it may be difficult to decide
when the purpose for the summons is to aid solely in a criminal pros-
ecution. 28 A summons for the sole purpose of criminal investigation
is the concern here because a summons issued for the dual purpose
of civil and criminal investigations has received judicial approval and
will be enforced.29 However, the fifth circuit has stated that a section
7602 summons is not enforceable if the investigation is predomi-
nantly for criminal prosecution.3 0
Differentiating between issuing a summons for an approved dual
purpose and for improper use in a criminal proceeding may prove dif-
ficult. Therefore, the Supreme Court, in a 1971 decision, has offered
some guidelines.31 The Court, analyzing dictum from a 1964 Supreme
Court case, 32 held that use of a section 7602 summons will be barred
only when the taxpayer can establish that the sole purpose of the in-
vestigation was to procure evidence for use in a criminal prosecu-
tion.33 The Court reasoned that criminal prosecution is a possibility
26. United States v. Moon, 616 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1980) (The IRS need only
meet its initial burden of showing proper purpose, then the burden of showing an
abuse of the court's process shifts to the taxpayer.). See also United States v. National
State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972) (Simply accusing the IRS of issuing a
summons for an improper purpose is insufficient to support a claim of bad faith.). But
cf. United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1975) (taxpayer is entitled
to a hearing prior to the enforcement of a summons in order to prevent abuse of the
court's process).
27. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(c) (1982).
28. For example, a civil tax investigation may be going on at the same time as a
criminal investigation.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp. 370, 379-80 (S.D. Tex.), affd per
curiam, 479 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1973).
30. In Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1968), a taxpayer was involved
in a political campaign with a third party and had issued three checks to the third
party. Even though the third party was a defendant in a criminal antitrust prosecu-
tion, he was forced to disclose all of his records relating to the checks as well as all
records relating to the campaign because such materials were relevant to, and would
be predominantly used for, investigating the tax liability of the taxpayer.
31. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (taxpayer argued that a section
7602 summons should not be enforced to aid an investigation that could potentially re-
sult in a criminal investigation).
32. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) (taxpayer sued for injunctive relief to
stop enforcement of a section 7602 summons. The Court avoided the issue by stating
that the taxpayer had an adequate remedy at law).
33. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531-36 (The Court cites, as examples, cases where a
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if the uncovered facts warrant such action, but mere possibility of
criminal charges is not enough to invalidate a section 7602
summons.
34
The Supreme Court gave further guidance in a 1978 case by stating
two elements for determining if a section 7602 summons is invalid.35
First, the summons must be issued before the IRS recommends to
the Department of Justice that a criminal prosecution should be un-
dertaken.36 Second, the IRS must, at all times, use their summons
authority in a good faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized
purpose of section 7602.3 7
The first element, recommendation for criminal prosecution, only
applies to formal recommendations. 38 For example, consider the case
of a special agent who recommends to his immediate supervisor that
a criminal prosecution begin. If the supervisor endorses the recom-
mendation and the Chief of Intelligence Division forwards the case to
the Assistant Regional Commissioner for review, a summons issued
thereafter is not invalid, on the theory that its purpose was to secure
evidence for criminal prosecution, because the IRS had not yet for-
warded the case to the Justice Department.39 Further, even though
an investigation may be "criminally oriented," the fact that no formal
recommendation has been made allows the summons to remain
criminal prosecution has begun or is pending when the summons is issued, or where
the investigation is only for criminal purposes.).
34. Id. (In essence, the IRS should not be restrained from investigating a taxpayer
simply because further improprieties by the taxpayer may be uncovered.).
35. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437
U.S. 298 (1978) (district court improperly refused enforcement of summons where evi-
dence did not necessarily indicate that the summons was issued in bad faith).
36. Id. at 308.
37. Id. That purpose is to determine the correctness of tax. See supra note 12.
38. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351-52 (9th Cir. 1977) (recom-
mendation for criminal prosecution was made by the District Director and forwarded
to Regional Counsel, but was never formally presented to the Justice Department;
therefore, absent a showing of bad faith, the summons is valid). See also Statement of
Organization and Functions, § 1113.55, 1974-1 C.B. 452, § 1113(11)22, 1974-1 C.B. 482,
§ 1116(3), 1974-1 C.B. 488, § 1118.6, 1974-1 C.B. 496 (regarding the internal procedure by
which recommendations for criminal prosecution are processed by the IRS).
39. United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 1972) (Civil and
criminal aspects are necessarily intertwined during a tax investigation. The civil and
criminal elements do not disentangle, however, until the Justice Department becomes
involved. It is at this point where the possibility of criminal prosecution becomes
likely. Therefore, it is also at this point in the investigation where the taxpayer's need
for protection from criminal prosecution ripens and the IRS must be restricted in its
investigation.).
valid.40
E. Specificity of a Section 7602 Summons
Due to the fact that the tax law arena is complicated and ever-
changing, the specificity requirements of a section 7602 summons are
inherently different from those of a criminal summons. However,
there still remains the fourth amendment requirement that the sum-
mons may not be indefinite.41
In general, the summons need not describe the records sought in
minute detail, but only with sufficient particularity to allow the per-
son on whom it is served to ascertain which records are to be pro-
duced.42 Applying this simple standard to complex tax litigation,
however, may prove to be a formidable task. While there is a social
policy of allowing the IRS sufficient power to enforce compliance
with voluntary reporting, the mere fact that tax law is complicated
does not excuse an overly broad summons. 43 This view presents a di-
lemma because, unlike most other civil litigation, almost all discover-
able documents are in one party's (the taxpayer's) hands. Therefore,
a balance must be struck between overly broad summonses and effec-
tive tax investigations.
The specificity element, along with purpose, good faith, and formal
recommendation for criminal prosecution, have been resolved in
favor of the IRS.44 For instance, the IRS may wish to prove the accu-
racy of a tax return, but the only information the IRS has is con-
tained on the return itself. Therefore, before a detailed investigation
may begin, the IRS must decide which issues are relevant. In es-
sence, the IRS cannot describe any documents with specificity before
it knows which documents it will need.45 In light of this, the IRS has
no choice but to employ a general summons. There remains, how-
40. United States v. Raabe, 431 F. Supp. 424, 428 (D.S.D. 1977) (taxpayer failed to
show an intent to use summonsed records as the basis for a criminal case).
41. Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48, 49 (E.D. Wis. 1963) (A warrant which
lacks particularity becomes a general exploratory search which is condemned by the
fourth amendment.).
42. United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3rd Cir. 1967),
cert denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
43. United States v. Richards, 479 F. Supp. 828, 833 (E.D. Va. 1979) (Questions di-
rected to the taxpayer by the IRS concerning auditing schemes designed to circumvent
tax laws must be sufficiently relevant and no broader than necessary to achieve their
purpose.).
44. This policy of favoring IRS discovery is further expounded in the section on
views favorable to the IRS.
45. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 1982), affd in
part, 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984) (The court reasoned that a generally broad summons must
be enforced before the specific issues are raised because if the taxpayer's own opinion
of relevance controlled the summons procedure, the entire audit process would be
eviscerated.).
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ever, reasonable limits to that power.46
F. Probable Cause
The parameters of probable cause in a section 7602 summons are
very easy to illustrate because section 7602 does not require the exist-
ence of probable cause that the law has been violated.47 In fact, a
summons may be issued merely because the IRS wishes assurance
that the tax laws have not been violated.48
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SUCH BROAD POWERS: IS THE
IRS Too POWERFUL?
A. In General
As the previous section illustrates, IRS examination authority
under section 7602 is very broad. Such power carries with it the pos-
sibility of abuse and selectivity by those agents who enforce the
law.49 Is the service given too much command? Is the potential for
abusive discretion too great? The courts have struggled with such
questions in reaching the decision that the IRS must be given broad
powers in order to be effective.
B. Views Favorable to the IRS
One must first realize that the IRS is an administrative agency
formed to promote voluntary reporting and to ensure that the gov-
ernment has sufficient tax revenues to survive.50 Like other admin-
istrative agencies, its investigatory powers have long been recognized
46. See, e.g., United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754-55 (4th Cir. 1973) (where
a summons was deemed to be too broad and too vague because it required the vice-
president of an accounting firm to produce all the records and all the returns of his
clients for a period of three years).
47. United States v. Mackay, 608 F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1979) (In essence, the
agent's prudent judgment in exercising the extensive power given to the IRS under
section 7602 is substituted for a requirement of probable cause.).
48. See generally United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451, 456 (2d Cir. 1979)
(the IRS should be allowed to follow up on an informant's tip by use of a section 7602
summons); United States v. Humedco Enterprises, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (Like a grand jury, the IRS has inquisitorial powers and must be given broad
discretion in its investigations.).
49. See Raymond, New Case Sets Limits on Service's Summons Power Under Sec-
tion 7602, 44 J. TAX'N 172 (1976) (analyzing a Colorado District Court case where the
IRS unsuccessfully tried to obtain a corporation's own analysis of the "weak spots" in
its tax return).
50. For a detailed description of the structure and purpose of the IRS, see Internal
Revenue Service Organizations and Functions, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,572 (1974).
by the courts.5 1 In particular, service examination powers are analo-
gous to that of a grand jury and should be liberally construed.52 In
fact, even though the summons is actually issued with regard to civil
matters, the investigative powers of the IRS are greater than those
normally granted in civil litigation.5 3
C. Views Favorable to the Taxpayer
In any situation where one party is given greater powers than the
other party, there is a possibility that the former may abuse those
powers. The courts have recognized that such IRS powers are subject
to abuse.5 4 Therefore, the courts have taken it upon themselves, in
part, to oversee the IRS and protect the taxpayer from undue
harassment.55
The taxpayer is also protected by statute. For example, the IRS
may not enforce its own summons. If a taxpayer refuses to comply
with the summons, the IRS must look to the court for enforcement.5 6
Also, the time and place of the examination is defined by statute and
Revenue Rulings.57
However, as stated earlier, the amount of protection given the tax-
payer and the extent to which the IRS is allowed to examine his
records must rest on social policy. The rationale behind section 7602
is "to prevent dishonest persons from escaping taxation and thus
51. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 148 (1975) ("John Dbe" summonses
regularly enforced in IRS investigations); Powell, 379 U.S. at 57 (administrative sum-
mons should not be limited by forecasts of the probable results of the investigation);
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950) (administrative agencies
should be given wide latitude in their investigative and accusatory duties).
52. United States v. Cortese, 540 F.2d 640, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1976); Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
53. One must note that the investigatory powers of the IRS also affect the admin-
istration of state laws. Specifically, the IRS may release specific tax information to
state tax officials in order to facilitate enforcement of state tax codes. See I.R.C. § 6103
(1982); Del. Order No. 101 (Rev. 1), 1978-2 C.B. (effective November 16, 1978).
54. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 146.
55. See, e.g., Powell, 379 U.S. at 57 (where the Supreme Court espoused the legiti-
mate purpose doctrine as well as placing other restraints on the IRS); Mastry, Bisceg-
lia and Humble Oil" A New Era in Internal Revenue Service Summonses, 50 FLA. B.J.
311 (1976) (regarding the issuance of "John Doe" summonses by the IRS). For congres-
sional history regarding the issues raised by "John Doe" summonses, see H.R. REP.
No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 310-12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2897, 3206-08; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 372-73, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3439, 3801-03.
56. In such a proceeding, "satisfactory proof" must be made to the court by the
IRS before an attachment may be issued. I.R.C. § 7604(b) (1982).
57. Such time and place must be within ten days from service of the summons and
reasonable under the circumstances. I.R.C. § 7605(a) (1982). See also Rev. Rul. 81-156,
1981-1 C.B. 597. Also note that the IRS sets its own policies which govern taxpayer ex-
aminations. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 81-35, 1981-2 C.B. 588 (regarding the reopening of a
closed case for the purpose of further examination).
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shifting heavier [tax] burdens to honest taxpayers."5 8 However, the
taxpayer must not lose his substantive rights under the guise of this
preventive power.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 7602
A. In General
The issues in tax law which are raised with respect to unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment and the privilege
against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment have been the
subject of many legal commentaries.5 9 Other issues may be raised but
they are generally outside the scope of a summons.60 The importance
of the fourth amendment in tax law is that it enables the taxpayer to
suppress evidence which is already in the government's hands. In
comparison, the fifth amendment can be used to prevent the IRS
from initially obtaining evidence.
B. Fourth Amendment Implications
The fourth amendment protects the taxpayer from "unreasonable
searches and seizures." 61 Since nearly all taxpayer records "may be
relevant" 62 to a tax investigation, the issue is generally whether the
search and seizure was "reasonable."63 For example, it has long been
58. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 146.
59. See Bowe, Miranda and the IRS: Protecting the Taxpayer by Administrative
Due Process, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 751 (1975); Herskovitz, Supreme Court Says Miranda
Warnings Do Not Apply to Non-Custodial Interviews, 45 J. TAX'N 5 (1976); Lipton,
Partnership Records Lose Fifth Amendment Protection, 5 TAX ADVISER 454 (1974);
Mednick & Greiner, Supreme Court Further Limits Scope of Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 41 J. TAX'N 182 (1974); Segal, Supreme Court: Fourth Amendment
Does Not Bar Subpoena of Taxpayer's Bank Records, 45 J. TAX'N 80 (1976).
60. See United States v. Harper, 397 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (held that the
government's legitimate interest in examining the taxpayer's records was sufficiently
compelling to overcome the taxpayer's religious ideals predicated upon the first
amendment).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated .. " Id.
Additionally, unlike the fifth amendment, the fourth amendment can be asserted by
corporate as well as individual taxpayers. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)
(union official had such a reasonable expectation of privacy in seized union records as
to be able to challenge the reasonableness of the search); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (corporations are protected from unlawful searches
and seizures).
62. See supra note 12.
63. See United States v. United Distillers Products Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.
1946) (the court held it was not unreasonable to demand production of records in a city
held that the fourth amendment may not be used to prevent exami-
nation of books and papers showing receipt of income by taxpayers.6 4
However, by showing that the IRS used unreasonable methods to
pursue such an examination, the taxpayer may be able to suppress
the ill-gotten records by arguing that an "unreasonable" search and
seizure had taken place.
Where the IRS has procured evidence by misrepresentation or de-
ception, such methods are also in violation of fourth amendment pro-
tections, and the evidence obtained can be suppressed.6 5 In order to
suppress evidence, the taxpayer must show that the misconduct af-
firmatively misled him, or that from the totality of the circumstances
his statements were not voluntary.66 However, if a special agent fails
to identify the specific nature of the audit, the courts do not deem
such inaction to be a deception worthy of fourth amendment
protection. 67
C. Fifth Amendment Implications
The right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination under
the fifth amendment is personal in nature.68 Further, actual posses-
25 miles from taxpayer's principle place of business); see also Redlich, Searches,
Seizures and Self-Incrimination in Tax Cases, 10 TAX L. REV. 191 (1955).
64. In re International Corp., 5 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (receipt of income
goes to the heart of proving the correctness of a return).
65. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (consent induced by trick-
ery is unlawful). But cf. United States v. Robson, 477 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1973) (failure of
an agent to advise taxpayer of the true purpose of his audit, e.g., to verify an inform-
ant's tip as to the crime of tax evasion, does not constitute deceit and trickery suffi-
cient to vitiate taxpayer's consent).
66. United States v. Bland, 458 F.2d 1, 8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972)
(in order to have legal effect, a misrepresentation must be material); see also United
States v. Willoz, 449 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1971) (totality of the circumstances); United
States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 957 (1973) (affirmatively misleading statements).
67. United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
842 (1972) (since there was no suspicion of criminal behavior at the time the investiga-
tion was made and because there was little chance the audit would lead to criminal
prosecution, taxpayer's consent was not obtained through fraud or misrepresentation);
United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 421 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021
(1971) (agent has no affirmative duty to inform the taxpayer of the extent and nature
of the investigation).
68. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). As Justice Powell succinctly
stated:
It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal
privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may in-
criminate him. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: "A party is privileged from pro-
ducing the evidence but not from its production." The Constitution explicitly
prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness "against himself"; it necessar-
ily does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another .... It
is extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense of
justice.
Id. at 328 (citation omitted).
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sion of the records is more important in asserting a fifth amendment
privilege than ownership of the records.69 The arguments have been
stated as follows: First, an individual is'protected from self-incrimi-
nation by being able to withhold private documents, but he may be
forced to produce public documents that are required by law.70 Tax-
payers are required by law to keep books of accounts or records. 71
Therefore, the authority to require recordkeeping implies the right
to inspect records on demand.72 Second, business records are deemed
not to be personal communications but business accounts.7 3 Since
other persons have knowledge of the records, such as employees, the
records are not of a personal nature and therefore do not come under
the protection of the fifth amendment.74
VI. APPLICATION OF SECTION 7602: ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT
Couch v. United States,75 a Supreme Court decision ruling that
there is no federally recognized accountant-client privilege, has been
widely accepted. 76 Further, no state has recognized such a privi-
lege. 77 The Court's opinion, written by Justice Powell, based its rea-
soning on the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
As to the fifth amendment, the Court recognized the fact that the
privilege against self-incrimination is a personal privilege. It adheres
69. Id. at 331-33. The Court stated that to tie the privilege of self-incrimination to
a concept of ownership would draw a meaningless line. Id. at 331.
70. United States v. Shapiro, 159 F.2d 890, 892 (2d Cir. 1947) defined public docu-
ments as, "information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of govern-
mental regulations ......
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1 (1976). "Any person subject to tax ... or any person re-
quired to file a return of information with respect to income, shall keep such perma-
nent books of account or records ... as are sufficient to establish ... matters
required to be shown by such person in any return of such tax or information." Id.
72. See United States v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 475 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Ohio 1978)
(Since the IRS has the authority to require that certain records be kept, it is implicit in
that authority that the IRS be allowed to inspect those records.).
73. United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972)
(business accounts relate to gross income, expenses and taxable earnings).
74. Id.
75. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
76. Id. This case has been either cited as support or, most often, followed in all
jurisdictions. Because it is such a widely accepted ruling, the reasoning behind it will
be used to explain this system. For background on the nature of the accountant-client
relationship, see Goldstein, Steps the Accountant Can Take Wen A Client is the Focus
of a Tax Fraud Investigation, 19 TAx. FOR AcCT. 178 (1977); Note, Couch v. United
States- Protection of Taxpayer's Records, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 810 (1974).
77. Couch, 409 U.S. at 335.
to the person, not to information which may be incriminating. 78
Since the plaintiff in that case had divested herself of control of the
records and the summons was directed against her accountant, the
ingredient of self-compulsion was lacking. There was no pressure or
coercion on the plaintiff to incriminate herself.79
In referring to the fourth amendment, Justice Powell stated that
there can be little expectation of privacy when a taxpayer hands over
records to an accountant.8 0 The reasoning behind this is that the tax-
payer knows that he is required to disclose what is contained in his
records to the IRS in the form of a tax return. Nondisclosure of in-
formation is due more to the accountant's wisdom than the tax-
payer's choice.8 1
The taxpayer is not left totally unprotected when he turns his tax
records over to a third party.8 2 Justice Brennan, in his concurring
opinion, recognized the fact that no per se rule defeating the tax-
payer's fifth amendment privilege had been created. In his view, this
privilege still exists for the taxpayer who hands his tax records over
to a third party, such as an accountant, for custodial safekeeping.8 3
However, Justice Douglas, in a caustic dissent, reflected on the fact
that the majority decision had overlooked the basic nature of the ac-
countant-client relationship.8 4 In order to accurately report his in-
come and legally take all his deductions, the average taxpayer, who is
in all likelihood unfamiliar with the complicated tax laws, may have
to seek an accountant for professional tax preparation and planning.
By refusing to allow any privilege between the taxpayer and his ac-
countant, the taxpayer is thus inhibited from making a full
disclosure.8 5
The result of such reasoning seems to run afoul of the basic
precepts behind voluntary reporting. By holding back information
78. Id. at 328. See also Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
79. Couch, 409 U.S. at 329. In effect it is the accountant, not the taxpayer, who is
compelled to produce the records.
80. Id. at 335.
81. Id. The accountant will often require the right to disclose the information
given to him for his own self protection.
82. Id. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan outlines some exceptions
which are stated in the text of this comment.
83. Id. See also United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959) (corporate
holding of personal papers); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956)
(constructive possession and control of the records remains with the owner when
records are handed over for custodial safekeeping).
84. Couch, 409 U.S. at 338 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas describes the
majority decision as "sanction[ing] yet another tool of the ever-widening governmental
invasion and oversight of our private lives." Id.
85. Id. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting). If the taxpayer knows that any information
he gives to the accountant is subject to examination, he may withhold any records
which may be incriminating. This will result in inaccurate reporting by the accountant
because he does not have the proper figures to begin with.
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from his accountant, the likelihood of inaccurate reporting by the ac-
countant comes to the forefront. This is exactly the situation which
section 7602 was designed to avoid.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Couch, argued that the transfer of
such records to an accountant is a result of practical considerations.8 6
This is the same uninformed taxpayer-professional tax preparer ar-
gument espoused by Justice Douglas. Further, Justice Marshall ex-
tended the reasonable expectation of privacy argument by stating
that the taxpayer expects that records handed over to a tax preparer
will remain confidential.87
Even though Justices Marshall and Douglas have raised valid
points, tax practitioners must follow the majority rule in Couch, and
try to protect their clients. The taxpayer who goes to an accountant
for help in preparing his taxes must be aware that there is no confi-
dential accountant-client privilege. The IRS may, pursuant to a sec-
tion 7602 summons, require the accountant to appear before the IRS
and produce such documents and provide such testimony as may be
relevant to ascertaining the correctness of the taxpayer's return.8 8
VII. APPLICATION OF SECTION 7602: ATTORNEY-CLIENT
One may assert the attorney-client privilege with regard to confi-
dential statements communicated to an attorney who is acting in his
professional capacity.8 9 Application of this privilege in the tax field
depends on whether the communication can be defined as confiden-
tial, and whether the attorney was acting in his professional capacity
when the communication was given.
The attorney-client privilege may only be raised when:
(1) [T]he asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2)
the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar
of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is
acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attor-
ney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)
86. Id. at 351 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In order to effectively claim all allowable
tax benefits for the taxpayer the accountant must be able to know the taxpayer's ac-
tual income and expenses.
87. Id. at 350 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's words, the taxpayer
expects the information given to the accountant to remain "within the sphere of activi-
ties that [the taxpayer] attempted to keep private." Id.
88. I.R.C. § 7602 (a)(1)-(2) (1982). See supra note 12 for a full text of section
7602(a)(1)-(2).
89. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Henderson v. Heinze, 349 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1965)
(The rationale underlying this privilege is to prevent inferences from the client's testi-
mony and to prevent the use of an attorney's statements as admissions of a client.).
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings .... and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.9 0
Although this privilege belongs to the client,91 the attorney may in-
voke the privilege and protect confidential communications made by
his client. 92 When the issue of privilege is raised, the burden falls
upon the one raising it to prove that the communication in question
comes within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 93
One of the major problems in asserting the privilege is whether or
not the matters communicated are intended to remain confidential.
When the taxpayer gives information to an attorney which will be
used in filling out tax returns, the client may have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy concerning the information.94 If those records
form the basis of information intended to be disclosed to the IRS,
however, they are no longer deemed confidential and the privilege
fails.95
Communications to the attorney must also be made to him, or his
subordinate, in his capacity as an attorney. Therefore, even though
the client may intend the communication to remain privileged, it will
not be so if the attorney is not acting in his professional capacity. For
example, if the client and his attorney are acting together as business
principals, their communications are not privileged.96 Also, if the at-
torney is merely executing financial transactions on behalf of his cli-
ent, communications regarding those transactions are not
privileged. 97 Similarly, if the attorney acquires real estate for his cli-
ent, communications regarding those actions are not privileged.98
Some communications made to an attorney relating to the prepara-
90. United States v. Long, 328 F. Supp. 233, 235 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
91. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.
1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
92. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1979).
93. United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), held that a party asserting
the privilege may not do so broadly, but must specify which communications come
under the privilege. Id at 39.
94. Couch, 409 U.S. at 350 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. United States v. Schoenberlein, 335 F. Supp. 1048, 1057-58 (D. Md. 1971) ("can-
celled checks and deposit slips were prepared with the intention that they should come
to the attention of the bank and/or others, and do not qualify for the privilege");
United States v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490, 492-93 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) (Material intended to
be communicated to a third party is not confidential in nature and hence does not
qualify for attorney-client privilege.).
96. See United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1973) (such commu-
nications relate to business dealings and are outside the scope of attorney-client
privilege).
97. McFee v. United States, 206 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1953) (depositing funds and
cashing checks).
98. Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993
(1953), held that such services are not confidential because the attorney is not acting in
his "professional capacity."
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tion of tax returns can come under the privilege. 99 However, many of
the communications by their nature are intended to be disclosed to
the IRS, and are not privileged. 10 0 It thus appears that the IRS
should not be allowed to examine a communication made to the at-
torney where its substance does not appear on the client's tax
forms.10 1
If the taxpayer-client delivers documents to the attorney, several
distinctions develop. First, if the documents are not privileged in the
hands of the taxpayer, they remain unprivileged even though they
are now in the attorney's possession. 0 2 However, if the documents
were privileged while in the taxpayer's possession and were delivered
to the attorney with the intention of securing legal advice, they will
remain privileged.103
When the attorney is also an accountant, the applicability of the at-
torney-client privilege depends on whether the communication is
made for the purpose of securing legal counsel or for bookkeeping
services. 1 0 4 In such a situation, accounting services would have to be
separated from legal services in order to discover which communica-
tions are susceptible to examination under a section 7602
99. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963). The court stated unequivocally, "[t]here can, of course, be no question that the
giving of tax advice and the preparation of tax returns... are basically matters suffi-
ciently within the professional competence of an attorney to make them prima facie
subject to the attorney-client privilege." Id at 637.
100. Pollock, 202 F.2d at 286.
101. While this proposition may seem to be a logical leap, the rationale for this
statement does have a judicial basis. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812,
815 (9th Cir. 1942) (Where an attorney had filled out a deed for a client, the client's
statements and motivations for executing the deed were deemed privileged while the
information contained in the deed itself was not privileged.).
102. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403-04 (1976) (Pre-existing documents
which the court could have forced the client to disclose were not protected from court
process simply because they were in the hands of the attorney.).
103. Id at 404. The court made this distinction because it found "the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is applicable." Id. However, one must note that this holding
is limited to records which were already in existence before the attorney entered the
case. Id. Two factors are thus important in deciding whether the attorney-client privi-
lege is applicable: (1) whether the taxpayer retained the attorney prior to preparation
of the records; and (2) whether they were prepared at the direction of the attorney.
Petersen, Attorney-Client Privilege in Internal Revenue Service Investigations, 54
MINN. L. REV. 67 (1969).
104. Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954) (attorney-client priv-
ilege is restricted to communications sent in the process of soliciting legal advice from
an attorney in his capacity as a professional legal advisor). See also United States v.
Heidberger, 76-1 T.C. 9366 (1976) (attorney who is also an accountant was required to
produce work papers used in the preparation of his client's income tax returns).
summons.
105
When the IRS seeks to enforce a summons on a third party such as
an attorney or an accountant, special rules apply. First, the IRS must
notify the taxpayer within three days after service of the summons
but not later than the twenty-third day before examination. 0 6 Fur-
ther, a copy of the summons and an explanation of the right to quash
the summons must be furnished to the taxpayer.107 Other proce-
dures such as fees for witnesses, the right to intervene, and the right
to stay compliance are further set out by a 1983 Treasury Decision.108
VIII. PRACTICE COMMENTS: RESPONDING TO A
SECTION 7602 SUMMONS
In reviewing section 7602 mechanics, one must remember that the
IRS looks to the court to enforce a summons. By refusing to comply
with the initial summons and forcing the IRS to obtain an enforce-
ment order from the court, the attorney may protect his client's pri-
vacy as well as save valuable time in familiarizing himself with the
client's case. Therefore, the first step in responding to a section 7602
summons could be refusal to comply.
If the taxpayer decides not to comply with the summons, there are
some advantages to this response. 0 9 First, the mere fact of noncoop-
eration will not support a tax fraud charge.1 ' 0 Such a fraud charge
must be based upon facts. Further, by refusing to comply with an
oral examination, the taxpayer may protect himself from making ref-
erence to incriminating acts which the IRS may not be aware of in
their analysis of secondary information.
On the other hand, the taxpayer may actually benefit by complying
with the summons. First, by handing over the requested documents,
the taxpayer assures himself that the initial IRS examination is made
with complete and correct information regarding the taxpayer's fi-
nancial affairs. The IRS would not have to rely upon secondary, and
perhaps incorrect, information. If the IRS does rely upon incorrect
information, it may lead to a full-scale fraud investigation and possi-
105. See Olender 210 F.2d at 805-06, which held that communications made with re-
gard to business advice are not privileged while communications made while seeking
legal advice from an attorney in his capacity as an attorney are privileged.
106. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (1982).
107. Id. § 7609(a)(1), (c)(1).
108. T.D. 7,899, 1983-2 C.B. 265. See also I.R.C. § 7610 (1982) (regarding fees for
witnesses).
109. Accord Baiter, Don't Cooperate with IRS Agent: Reliance on Constitutional
Rights Is Better Tactic, 6 J. TAX'N 293 (1957); Crowley, The Role of the Practitioner
When His Client Faces a Criminal Tax Fraud Investigation, 40 J. TAX'N 18 (1974).
110. Knowles, 224 F.2d at 169 (taxpayer was charged with fraud because he made
affirmative false statements to the IRS).
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bly criminal charges.1 1' The taxpayer will want to avoid such a situa-
tion when he has taken a reasonable position on his tax standing.
Second, there is a human nature element to consider. Antagonizing a
special agent assigned to analyze the taxpayer's position can have no
real advantages. Noncooperation may lead the agent to believe that
the taxpayer is hiding something. This in turn may cause the agent
to scrutinize the taxpayer's status more closely than he had originally
intended.112 In any event, if the taxpayer initially decides to cooper-
ate and then discovers that the investigation is leading to possibly in-
criminating documents, he may later invoke his constitutional rights
and demand a return of his documents.11 3
However, should the taxpayer decide to comply with the summons,
he must do so truthfully and completely. If the IRS later discovered
that the taxpayer was feeding them false information, this could not
help but lead to a full-scale audit. Further, not only may such action
lead to later tax fraud charges, but it may be a crime in and of
itself.114
Finally, in order to be able to better claim the attorney-client privi-
lege, the attorney should take some precautionary steps of his own.
For example, while interviewing a client the attorney should care-
fully make note of when he is giving legal advice in his capacity as an
attorney, and when he is simply helping the taxpayer with a business
analysis. By documenting and separating these two topics in his files,
the attorney will be better prepared to assist his client when the IRS
shows up at his office with a section 7602 summons. The privileged
communications will already be separated from the non-privileged
communications, and the attorney will be better prepared to protect
his client.
111. For information on how the IRS handles criminal investigations, see IRS Man-
ual § P-9-2 (1973) (regarding the criteria employed).
112. Armstrong v. United States, 354 F.2d 274 (Ct. Cl. 1965). "The agents construed
[the taxpayer's] resentment as reflecting a lack of cooperation on his part, and forth-
with launched a full investigation which ultimately was extended to cover his income
tax returns for the years 1945-1950." Id. at 279.
113. Mason v. Pulliam, 402 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affd, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.
1977) (The taxpayer has a sufficient property interest in the documents to demand
their return, and may also demand that any copies also be returned.). See also United
States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (regard-
ing the constitutional basis for demanding return of the documents).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (Making knowingly false statements in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any agency of the United States can result in a fine of "not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both."). Knowles
v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1955) (statement made to the IRS is
within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States).
IX. CONCLUSION
The plight of the beleaguered taxpayer, who is charged with know-
ing and abiding by complicated tax laws, is outweighed by the need of
the IRS to be able to enforce those laws. Reporting compliance is a
must in order for the United States to collect needed tax revenues.
Therefore, the IRS must be given broad examination powers. There
are, however, specific checks on those powers. A summons must be
executed in good faith before recommendation for criminal prosecu-
tion, and there must be a legitimate purpose for the summons.
Still, the IRS may enforce its adminstrative summons in situations
where no other branch of the government can. Most notable is the
fact that no probable cause is required before issuance of a section
7602 summons. Here, the integrity of the agent is substituted for
probable cause. Also, the IRS may inquire into communications
made between a taxpayer and his attorney. Such invasions into the
taxpayer's privacy must be required, or the IRS would be without
power to enforce the tax laws and noncompliance would bankrupt
the country.
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